We take security seriously and work to keep this project up to date. If you discover a security vulnerability, please report it privately so we can investigate and ship a fix before the issue becomes public.

Please use one of the following private channels — do not open a public issue, pull request, or discussion for security concerns:

1. Preferred: open a private report via GitHub's Privately reporting a security vulnerability flow on this repository's Security tab.
2. Email: send the details to hello@hyphen.ai. If the issue is urgent, include [SECURITY] in the subject line and we will respond as soon as possible.

When reporting, please include as much of the following as you can:

• A description of the vulnerability and its impact.
• Steps to reproduce, or a proof-of-concept.
• The affected version(s) and platform.
• Any suggested remediation, if you have one.

We will acknowledge receipt, work with you on a coordinated disclosure timeline, and credit you in the advisory once a fix is published unless you ask to remain anonymous.

This repository follows the defense-in-depth hardening checklist; progress is tracked in DEFENSE_IN_DEPTH.md. Measures currently in place:

• All changes land through pull requests — direct pushes to main are blocked, and merging requires passing status checks.
• Tags can only be created by repository admins; published GitHub Releases are immutable (assets and tags cannot be changed after publish).
• Workflow runs from outside collaborators always require maintainer approval, and only allowlisted GitHub Actions can run.
• Secret scanning and push protection are enabled; private vulnerability reporting is enabled.
• CI workflows default to read-only contents permissions; generated output is not committed back from CI; every action is pinned to a full commit SHA; Socket Firewall (sfw) wraps pnpm install; workflows are security-linted with zizmor on every PR.
• Release jobs disable setup-node's default package-manager cache.
• The release workflow stages packages with pnpm stage publish (pack then stage a tarball); it does not publish live. CI authenticates with stage-only OIDC trusted publishing; Drydock reviews the staged artifact; a maintainer promotes with 2FA. There are no npm tokens.
• Aikido Security scans pull requests; the release stage job does not run unless an Aikido scan-release gate passes.
• Workflows that run untrusted pull-request code do not use pull_request_target.
• The package manager is pinned in package.json (packageManager).
• There is no Dependabot config; dependency updates land through pull requests.
• Codespaces and Cursor Cloud Agents install through Aikido Safe Chain; package-manager shims must not be bypassed.
• The Codespaces Dev Container image is pinned by digest (name:<tag>@sha256:<digest>), not a floating tag.
• Dependencies install through pnpm with a 7-day cooldown on new versions, lifecycle scripts blocked by default, and trustPolicy: no-downgrade.