feat: version 2 asset unlocks with stable txids and InstantSend locks (DIP-0027 amendment, v24)

[PastaPastaPasta]

Issue being fixed or feature implemented

Users want Platform→Core withdrawals to be rapidly respendable with InstantSend finality. Today that is impossible: an Asset Unlock can expire before it is mined, Platform then re-signs the withdrawal, and because the re-signed transaction has a different txid, any transaction spending the unmined unlock's outputs is invalidated — so spends of unmined unlocks can never be islocked.

This PR implements version 2 Asset Unlock transactions (spec: dashpay/dips#189), activating with DEPLOYMENT_V24: the txid itself is computed with the quorum signing info (requestedHeight, quorumHash, quorumSig) zeroed — exactly and provably the only fields Platform changes when it re-signs an expired withdrawal. Every re-signed instance of one withdrawal is therefore the same transaction: children reference one stable txid forever and survive expiry and re-signing. This is segwit's txid/wtxid split applied to the quorum-sig fields — no aliasing in the mempool, UTXO set, or wallet layers; the spending model stays completely standard.

On top of that, the unlock itself is InstantSend-locked as soon as it can be mined in the next block, using its withdrawal index as a synthetic input. An islock attests "this will be mined and nothing in consensus prevents it"; for an unlock that holds as long as Platform keeps re-signing, which it is obligated to do (there is no refund path), and signing only minable-now instances makes any failure a double fault. Once locked, the withdrawal is like any other locked transaction: children are ordinary islocked spends, the wallet trusts its outputs, and Platform→Core transfers become rapidly respendable.

What was done?

Consensus — hashing rule (primitives/transaction, evo/assetlocktx)

• v2 payloads are serialized byte-identically to v1; the version byte (gated on v24, bad-assetunlocktx-version-2, mirroring Asset Lock v2) changes hashing: the txid zeroes the trailing 132 payload bytes. The full-serialization hash remains available as GetInstanceHash() (computed on demand for v2 unlocks, equal to the txid for every other transaction).
• The signed message hash is unchanged — it zeroes only quorumSig and still commits to requestedHeight/quorumHash — and is now computed explicitly from the full serialization (using GetHash() on the sig-zeroed copy would silently zero all three fields under the new rule). Signature validity rules (48-block window, active-quorum-set+1 recency) are identical to v1.

Consensus — coinbase commitment (evo/cbtx, validation, node/miner, blockencodings)

• v2 txids exclude the sig bytes, so the block merkle root no longer commits to them. CbTx version 4 (required post-v24) adds merkleRootAssetUnlocks: the merkle root over the instance hashes of the block's v2 unlocks (null when none). Verified in CheckMerkleRoot as a mutation check (bad-cbtx-assetunlockmerkleroot, BLOCK_MUTATED), mirroring segwit's witness commitment: a middleman can flip sig bytes without breaking the merkle root, and treating that as invalidity would let it poison an honest block's hash.
• Compact block short IDs are computed from instance hashes (BIP152v2's wtxid move): a mempool entry holding a different re-signed instance of a mined withdrawal is requested via getblocktxn instead of being spliced into the reconstructed block; FillBlock's existing IsBlockMutated check backstops short-ID collisions.

Mempool (validation, txmempool, node/transaction, node/miner)

• A re-signed instance shares the entry's txid; ATMP routes it through a refresh path that fully validates it and, when requestedHeight is higher, swaps the CTransactionRef in place — descendants, ancestry, and fee accounting untouched because everything the txid covers is identical. Stale/duplicate instances are rejected (assetunlock-stale-instance). sendrawtransaction submits refreshes instead of short-circuiting on the known txid.
• v2 unlocks are not expiry-evicted: an expired instance waits in the mempool for its replacement, so children never die with it; the miner instead skips instances that aren't currently minable. Since unlocks have no inputs, a new outputs-already-known check prevents an already-mined instance from re-entering (and, for v2, lingering).
• The mempool tracks the pending withdrawal total (outputs + fee of every unlock it holds, the quantity the credit pool charges) and a withdrawal-index map. The credit pool limit is enforced only at block connect, so this is what lets InstantSend tell an over-limit unlock from a minable one. Exposed as getmempoolinfo.pendingassetunlocks. Mining any instance of a withdrawal evicts every other instance claiming its index.
• At most one claimant per withdrawal index is held: a second unlock claiming an index under a different txid (a v1 instance signed pre-fork re-signed as v2 post-fork, or a Platform fault) is rejected as assetunlock-stale-instance unless its requestedHeight is higher, in which case it evicts the held claimant and its descendants, mirroring the in-place refresh. Checked before signature verification. The credit pool lookup in ATMP is wrapped: a local reconstruction failure is a TX_BAD_SPECIAL rejection (no peer punishment) and EvoDB corruption an error state, never an escaped exception.

InstantSend (instantsend/*, validation)

• The v2 unlock itself is islocked, not just its children. Unlocks have no inputs, so the lock pins one synthetic outpoint: {DIP-27 request id = SHA256d("plwdtx" ‖ index), 0} (instantsend::GetLockInputs). Every instance of one withdrawal, whatever its version or txid, maps to that outpoint, so a lock binds the index to one txid, any other claimant conflicts through the ordinary outpoint conflict path, and a re-sign (same txid) leaves the lock intact. Wire format unchanged.
• Masternodes sign the lock only when the unlock is minable in the next block (CheckCanLockAssetUnlock): stable-txid instance, passes the full special-tx check at the tip including its quorum signature, no other instance of its index in the mempool (a withdrawal signed as v1 pre-fork can be re-signed as v2 post-fork under a different txid), and the mempool's pending withdrawal total fits the credit pool's current limit. Platform pools withdrawals under the same limit, so a pending total above it indicates a fault and nothing is signed until the window clears. Both the height window and the limit move with the tip, so every tracked unmined unlock is re-evaluated on each connected block; a refresh re-triggers an attempt too.
• Consequences that fall out for free: children are ordinary islocked spends (the rev-3 CheckCanLock exception is gone), the wallet trusts a locked withdrawal's outputs via IsTxLockedByInstantSend, and the mempool's time-based expiry already spares locked transactions.
• Every vin.empty() early-out in InstantSend (including the IS-DB block hooks that mark locks mined and the block-connect conflict filter) goes through HasLockInputs. A peer islock on an unlock whose inputs are anything but the synthetic outpoint is dropped. Mined unlocks are tracked but not locked retroactively, since ChainLocks never wait for them.
• getassetunlockstatuses reports instantlock for mempooled indexes.

P2P relay (net_processing, protocol, version)

• txid-based announcement can never propagate a refresh (known-txid dedup; rejects-filter poisoning). New MSG_ASSET_UNLOCK inventory type (protocol 70242) announces v2 unlocks by instance hash; getdata is answered with a plain tx message; requests and the rejects filter are tracked per instance. Older peers get a MSG_TX announcement of the current instance and never see refreshes.

RPC & signing tooling (core_write, rpc/quorums, llmq/signing*)

• instanceHash in v2 unlock JSON. platformsign allows re-signing a request id with a different message hash. Platform recovered signatures are retained per message and retrieved by the requested message hash, so out-of-order delivery preserves both signatures. Share processing stops only for a matching Platform message, including on members that learned the earlier signature without voting. Each retained signature expires independently. Production Platform signing (Tenderdash vote extensions) is unaffected; this aligns Core's local signing path used by tests/tooling.

Tests

• Unit: txid invariance across the signing fields (and only those), CMutableTransaction agreement, msgHash semantics, v1 hashing unchanged, DIP-0027 worked-example vectors, CbTx unlock-root calculation.
• Unit: lock inputs of an unlock (synthetic outpoint, same for every version/instance of an index, distinct per index; ordinary txs / commitments / coinbase unchanged); mempool pending amount and index map across add, refresh, cross-version duplicate, index-conflict eviction and removal.
• Unit: ATMP rejects a staler claimant of a held withdrawal index before signature verification; credit pool snapshot persisted at a snapshot height when block assembly constructed the pool first; InstantSend tracker drops an unlocked unlock removed from the mempool and hands a queued unlock out once per trigger.
• Functional (feature_asset_locks.py): pre-fork v2 rejection; spend of an unmined v2 unlock by its stable txid; refresh in place (same txid, child untouched, instanceHash rotates); MSG_ASSET_UNLOCK inv observed for both the initial instance and the refresh; stale-instance rejection; survival of the expired instance + child; window clearing; fresh re-sign mined together with the child; CbTx v4 commitment asserted against the mined instance hash. With InstantSend enabled: the unlock is not locked while the pending total exceeds the limit (an ordinary tx is), the wallet does not trust the child's output, the re-signed minable instance within the limit is locked with the withdrawal index as its single input, the child is then locked through the ordinary path and trusted by the wallet, and a second withdrawal refused on the limit is locked by the per-block retry once the window clears and it is refreshed. Cross-version claimants: a v2 instance signed at the same height as the held v1 instance is rejected, a v2 unlock wrapped in a dstx message goes through DSTX validation and is dropped, and a v2 instance signed one block later replaces the v1 claimant and gets locked.

How Has This Been Tested?

• feature_asset_locks.py passes locally (macOS arm64) including the extended test_asset_unlock_v2 scenario; also feature_llmq_is_retroactive.py, feature_llmq_is_cl_conflicts.py, feature_llmq_chainlocks.py, feature_llmq_singlenode.py, feature_notifications.py, rpc_netinfo.py, p2p_dstx.py, feature_protx_version.py, mempool_unbroadcast.py, interface_rest.py, wallet_basic.py.
• Full test_dash unit suite passes.
• Lints: circular dependencies (two new expected entries registered), whitespace, python, assertions.
• The DIP worked-example vectors produced by dip-0027/dip-0027-txid-calc.py match Core's hashing byte-for-byte (pinned in a unit test).

Breaking Changes

• Consensus (v24 EHF, inactive until params are set): v2 Asset Unlock payloads become acceptable and CbTx v4 becomes required once v24 activates; before activation both are rejected. This must be code-complete before the v24 EHF parameters (bit 12, currently NEVER_ACTIVE) are finalized.
• Hashing: for v2 unlocks (which cannot exist pre-fork), txid ≠ H(full serialization). Light clients verifying merkle proofs for these transactions and explorer libraries computing txids from raw bytes need the one scoped rule; SPV output tracking and spending are otherwise completely standard.
• P2P: protocol bumped to 70242 for the MSG_ASSET_UNLOCK inventory type.

Known follow-ups (deliberately out of scope):

• Platform-side emitter PR (payload version byte + deterministic v24 gate on core_chain_locked_height); Platform's Tenderdash signing already produces the unchanged message hash.
• Restart gap: LoadMempool re-runs acceptance, so an expired v2 instance (and its children) is dropped on restart until the refresh arrives; the islock itself is persisted in the IS DB and wallet rebroadcast heals it. Accepting an expired instance whose txid is islocked on reload is a possible refinement.
• Ecosystem: anything computing txids from raw bytes (rust-dashcore Transaction::txid(), dash-spv, DashSync, dashj, explorers) needs the scoped v2 rule before activation.
• p2p-level regression tests for the legacy-peer (<70242) MSG_TX announcement path and for the rejects-filter poisoning scenario a rejected instance is announced over p2p, then a fresh instance must still propagate. The current functional test exercises the mempool refresh and MSG_ASSET_UNLOCK inv end-to-end but drives the stale-instance rejection via sendrawtransaction.
• The wallet keeps whatever instance it first saw (AddToWallet is a no-op on a known txid), so gettransaction may show a stale instance's requestedHeight/quorumSig; ZMQ/index consumers do observe each refresh. No fund-safety impact (outputs are identical across instances).
• Multi-transaction testmempoolaccept still rejects held unlocks as duplicate txids; single-transaction submission and submitpackage support instance refresh. Package preflight rejects duplicate withdrawal indexes before any submission, including when all claimants are new, and both submitpackage and multi-transaction testmempoolaccept reject a package that spends a mempool claimant (or one of its descendants) that admitting a packaged unlock would evict.

Checklist:

• I have performed a self-review of my own code
• I have commented my code, particularly in hard-to-understand areas
• I have added or updated relevant unit/integration/functional/e2e tests
• I have made corresponding changes to the documentation (docs(dip27): version 2 Asset Unlock transactions with stable txids and InstantSend locks dips#189)
• I have assigned this pull request to a milestone

🤖 Generated with Claude Code

[knst]

CI failed because:

txmempool.cpp:690:13: error: reading variable 'mapAssetUnlockWithdrawalIds' requires holding mutex 'cs' [-Werror,-Wthread-safety-analysis]
  690 |             mapAssetUnlockWithdrawalIds.insert_or_assign(*withdrawal_id, tx_hash);
      |             ^
txmempool.cpp:691:13: error: calling function 'linkAssetUnlockChildren' requires holding mutex 'cs' exclusively [-Werror,-Wthread-safety-analysis]
  691 |             linkAssetUnlockChildren(newit, *withdrawal_id);
      |             ^
txmempool.cpp:792:27: error: reading variable 'mapAssetUnlockWithdrawalIds' requires holding mutex 'cs' [-Werror,-Wthread-safety-analysis]
  792 |             if (auto it = mapAssetUnlockWithdrawalIds.find(*withdrawal_id);
      |                           ^
txmempool.cpp:793:23: error: reading variable 'mapAssetUnlockWithdrawalIds' requires holding mutex 'cs' [-Werror,-Wthread-safety-analysis]
  793 |                 it != mapAssetUnlockWithdrawalIds.end() && it->second == tx_hash) {
      |                       ^
txmempool.cpp:794:17: error: reading variable 'mapAssetUnlockWithdrawalIds' requires holding mutex 'cs' [-Werror,-Wthread-safety-analysis]
  794 |                 mapAssetUnlockWithdrawalIds.erase(it);
      |                 ^
5 errors generated.

[github-actions]

This pull request has conflicts, please rebase.

[chatgpt-codex-connector]

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Review	Status	Commit	Review trigger
📝 Code Review	✅ Completed 2026-09-16T03:31:27.966690Z	4a2c362	New commits

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[github-actions]

Potential PR merge conflicts

This is advisory only. It does not block CI, but it marks PRs that will likely need a rebase depending on merge order.

If this PR merges first

These open PRs will likely need a rebase:

• #7684: backport: bitcoin#26186, #26251, #26471, #26631, #26646, #26877, #26884, #26886, #26887, #26991 Changed files: src/Makefile.am, src/evo/assetlocktx.h, src/rpc/mempool.cpp, src/txmempool.h, src/validation.cpp, test/functional/feature_asset_locks.py.

If these PRs merge first

This PR will likely need a rebase:

• #7593: feat: build, chain-validate, and seed evo snapshot state Changed files: src/Makefile.am, src/evo/creditpool.cpp, src/evo/creditpool.h, src/evo/evodb.h, src/evo/specialtxman.cpp, src/test/util/setup_common.cpp.
• #7601: feat: emit and seed the evo snapshot section in dumptxoutset and snapshot load Changed files: src/Makefile.am, src/evo/creditpool.cpp, src/evo/creditpool.h, src/evo/evodb.h, src/evo/specialtxman.cpp, src/test/util/setup_common.cpp, src/validation.cpp, test/lint/lint-circular-dependencies.py.
• #7684: backport: bitcoin#26186, #26251, #26471, #26631, #26646, #26877, #26884, #26886, #26887, #26905, #26991 Changed files: src/Makefile.am, src/evo/assetlocktx.h, src/rpc/mempool.cpp, src/txmempool.h, src/validation.cpp, test/functional/feature_asset_locks.py.

[thepastaclaw]

⚠️ DEGRADED — Final review complete — no blockers (commit 5e4cba8) · triage: critical · stand-in models (primary models out of quota)

[PastaPastaPasta]

PastaClaw, please prioritize review of this PR now that it has been rebased onto the latest develop and force-pushed. The local build and targeted unit/lint checks pass; please review the rebased tip and call out any required changes.

---

🤖 Posted autonomously by Codex on behalf of pasta.

[PastaPastaPasta]

[x] Request priority review

Please move this review to the front of the queue now that the PR has been rebased and validated.

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Walkthrough

The change adds version 2 Asset Unlock support across transaction hashing, validation, InstantSend, mempool replacement, peer relay, mining, CbTx commitments, RPC output, and tests. Version 2 unlocks use stable txids and separate instance hashes. Platform quorum signatures now support multiple message-scoped signatures for one request. Credit-pool snapshot writes now require an active transaction owned by the calling thread.

Priority: ➖ Normal

Estimated code review effort: 5 (Critical) | ~90 minutes

Severity of issue fixed: Medium

Sequence Diagram(s)

sequenceDiagram
  participant Wallet
  participant Validation
  participant CTxMemPool
  participant CInstantSendManager
  participant PeerManager
  participant Miner
  Wallet->>Validation: submit version 2 Asset Unlock
  Validation->>CTxMemPool: accept or refresh by instance hash
  CTxMemPool->>CInstantSendManager: queue lock retry
  CInstantSendManager->>PeerManager: announce MSG_ASSET_UNLOCK
  Miner->>CTxMemPool: select minable unlocks
  Miner->>Miner: commit merkleRootAssetUnlocks in CbTx

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Merge Risk: 🔵 Low · up to a5c76

Rejected Asset Unlocks can be re-requested by legacy peers, causing bounded repeated validation and network/CPU overhead. The mock-time and pending-amount concerns are resolved, so the change is otherwise mergeable with this follow-up.

🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 4 | ❌ 1

❌ Failed checks (1 warning)

Check name	Status	Explanation	Resolution
Docstring Coverage	⚠️ Warning	Docstring coverage is 13.71% which is insufficient. The required threshold is 80.00%. Docstring coverage is scoped to functions touched by this diff. Analyzed 197 functions across 48 files.	Write docstrings for the functions missing them to satisfy the coverage threshold.

✅ Passed checks (4 passed)

Check name	Status	Explanation
Linked Issues check	✅ Passed	Check skipped because no linked issues were found for this pull request.
Out of Scope Changes check	✅ Passed	Check skipped because no linked issues were found for this pull request.
Description check	✅ Passed	The description clearly explains the version 2 Asset Unlock implementation, stable transaction IDs, InstantSend locking, relay changes, mempool behavior, compatibility requirements, and tests. It is d…
Title check	✅ Passed	The title concisely identifies the main change: version 2 Asset Unlocks with stable transaction IDs and InstantSend locks under the v24 and DIP-0027 context.

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Actionable comments posted: 5

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Inline comments:
In `@src/evo/evodb.h`:
- Line 125: Update HasActiveTransaction() to return true only when called from
the thread that owns the active transaction; otherwise return false, while
preserving the existing active_transaction.has_value() behavior for the owning
thread.

In `@src/llmq/signing.cpp`:
- Line 552: Update TruncateRecoveredSig and both of its call sites to pass
deleteTimeKey=true when removing the recovered signature, ensuring the stale
rs_t entry is deleted while rs_h and rs_s are retained.

In `@src/test/evo_assetlocks_tests.cpp`:
- Around line 662-664: Strengthen the assertions after
ReplaceAssetUnlockInstance by verifying that unlock_v2 and unlock_v2_resigned
have different instance hashes, then retrieve the mempool transaction using its
stable transaction ID and assert its instance hash equals
unlock_v2_resigned->GetInstanceHash().
- Around line 507-511: Update the re-signing test cases in
src/test/evo_assetlocks_tests.cpp:507-511 and
src/test/evo_assetlocks_tests.cpp:635-638 to use non-empty, differing quorumSig
values. In the make_unlock_tx helper, verify that changing quorumSig preserves
the stable txid while changing the instance hash; in the Asset Unlock commitment
test, verify that changing quorumSig changes the commitment root.

In `@src/validation.cpp`:
- Line 1301: Update AcceptMultipleTransactions and AcceptPackage to apply the
same instance-hash and freshness handling used by TryAssetUnlockRefresh before
stable transaction ID rejection or de-duplication. Ensure a fresher Asset Unlock
instance is refreshed and accepted in both multi-transaction testmempoolaccept
and submitpackage flows, while preserving existing behavior for non-fresher
instances.

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📒 Files selected for processing (43)

• doc/release-notes-7639.md
• src/blockencodings.cpp
• src/core_write.cpp
• src/evo/assetlocktx.cpp
• src/evo/assetlocktx.h
• src/evo/cbtx.cpp
• src/evo/cbtx.h
• src/evo/core_write.cpp
• src/evo/creditpool.cpp
• src/evo/evodb.h
• src/evo/specialtxman.cpp
• src/instantsend/db.cpp
• src/instantsend/instantsend.cpp
• src/instantsend/instantsend.h
• src/instantsend/lock.cpp
• src/instantsend/lock.h
• src/instantsend/net_instantsend.cpp
• src/instantsend/signing.cpp
• src/instantsend/signing.h
• src/llmq/signing.cpp
• src/llmq/signing_shares.cpp
• src/net_processing.cpp
• src/node/miner.cpp
• src/node/transaction.cpp
• src/primitives/transaction.cpp
• src/primitives/transaction.h
• src/protocol.cpp
• src/protocol.h
• src/rpc/json_help.cpp
• src/rpc/mempool.cpp
• src/rpc/quorums.cpp
• src/rpc/rawtransaction.cpp
• src/test/evo_assetlocks_tests.cpp
• src/test/evo_islock_tests.cpp
• src/test/util/setup_common.cpp
• src/txmempool.cpp
• src/txmempool.h
• src/validation.cpp
• src/version.h
• test/functional/feature_asset_locks.py
• test/functional/test_framework/messages.py
• test/functional/test_framework/p2p.py
• test/lint/lint-circular-dependencies.py

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[PastaPastaPasta]

Applied the validated review fixes in 585ac12926 and pushed them:

• HasActiveTransaction() now reports an active transaction only to its owning thread.
• Recovered-signature replacement removes stale time-index bookkeeping while retaining hash/session keys.
• Asset Unlock mempool refresh tests now verify instance-hash rotation and stable-txid lookup.

The incremental build and targeted evo_assetlocks_tests / evo_islock_tests pass. Package acceptance refresh handling remains under review because it requires restructuring package validation and submission semantics.

---

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[thepastaclaw]

⚠️ DEGRADED — Re-review — Final validation — Phase 1 + Phase 2

⚠️ DEGRADED review. The primary review models were unavailable (gpt-6-astra unavailable: All credentials for model gpt-6-astra are cooling down (last error: usage_limit_reached: The usage limit has been reache), so this review ran on stand-in models: gpt-5.6-luna → muse-spark-1.3-contributor, gpt-5.6-sol → muse-spark-1.3-contributor, gpt-5.6-terra → muse-spark-1.3-contributor, gpt-6-astra → muse-spark-1.3-contributor. Both review phases and the independent verifiers still ran, but on weaker models, with Phase 1 capped at high effort. Treat the verdict as provisional; a full-strength re-review will run on the next push once the primary models are back.

All 13 prior blocking and logic findings verify fixed at the rebased tip: package test acceptance shares the eviction check, Platform signatures are retained per message with per-message recovery checks, DSTX branches key on message type, known-filter txid insertion is version-gated, credit-pool lookups are exception-guarded, single-claimant enforcement and stale-instance handling are in place, and InstantSend tracking cleanup is bounded. Remaining asks are commit-history squash preferences the author has deliberately declined across rebases in favor of atomic history. No new defects found; the PR is functionally complete at this head.

🔴 0 blocking | 🟡 0 suggestion(s) | 💬 0 nitpick(s)

Review provenance

Source: reviewer 1: gemini-3.8-flash-high (agent: phase1-reviewer, role: general); reviewer 2: gemini-3.8-flash-high (agent: phase1-reviewer, role: dash-core-commit-history); reviewer 3: muse-spark-1.3-contributor (standing in for gpt-6-astra) (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: general); reviewer 4: muse-spark-1.3-contributor (standing in for gpt-6-astra) (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: dash-core-commit-history); reviewer 5: muse-spark-1.3-contributor (standing in for gpt-6-astra) (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: general); reviewer 6: muse-spark-1.3-contributor (standing in for gpt-6-astra) (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: dash-core-commit-history); final verifier: muse-spark-1.3-contributor (standing in for gpt-6-astra) (agent: astra-verifier, role: final-verifier)

• Degraded mode: gpt-6-astra unavailable: All credentials for model gpt-6-astra are cooling down (last error: usage_limit_reached: The usage limit has been reache (detected by probe, since 2026-09-18T05:22:01Z); stand-ins gpt-5.6-luna → muse-spark-1.3-contributor, gpt-5.6-sol → muse-spark-1.3-contributor, gpt-5.6-terra → muse-spark-1.3-contributor, gpt-6-astra → muse-spark-1.3-contributor; Phase 1 effort capped at high
• Triage: critical by muse-spark-1.3-contributor (standing in for gpt-6-astra) (effort low) — Large 50-file (+1980/-233) change alters consensus txid hashing in src/primitives/transaction.cpp and adds CbTx v4 merkle commitment enforced in validation.cpp.
• Phase 1 reviewers: gemini-3.8-flash-high — general (completed, effort high); agent phase1-reviewer, gemini-3.8-flash-high — dash-core-commit-history (completed, effort high); agent phase1-reviewer
• Phase 1 model: gemini-3.8-flash-high — antigravity quota: weekly 100% left, 5h 100% left
• Fresh final gate: an independent Phase-2 review ran after iterative findings were reconciled
• Fresh verifier: muse-spark-1.3-contributor (standing in for gpt-6-astra) — final-verifier; agent astra-verifier
• Phase 2 reviewers: muse-spark-1.3-contributor (standing in for gpt-6-astra) — general (completed, effort xhigh); agent phase2-reviewer, muse-spark-1.3-contributor (standing in for gpt-6-astra) — dash-core-commit-history (completed, effort xhigh); agent phase2-reviewer, muse-spark-1.3-contributor (standing in for gpt-6-astra) — general (completed, effort xhigh); agent phase2-reviewer, muse-spark-1.3-contributor (standing in for gpt-6-astra) — dash-core-commit-history (completed, effort xhigh); agent phase2-reviewer

🤖 Prompt for all review comments with AI agents

These findings are from an automated code review. Verify the current code and confirm that no unresolved issues remain.

No unresolved findings remain from the prior review on this head.